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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Sensor Networks 
A sensor is a small measunng device that can monitor some physical 
phenomenon (like atmospheric gas content) and send the information to a destination that 
collects the data. A Sensor Network is a wireless system containing tiny sensors and 
actuators and may have thousands of low-power, low-cost nodes comprised of these 
sensors/actuators. These networks can be heterogeneous in the sense that different 
sensors may be capable of observing and reporting on various dynamic properties of their 
terrain. Nodes may also be mobile or stable. 
Sensor networks have been proposed for military surveillance and environmental 
monitoring applications. They are rapidly emerging as an important new area in the 
research community. The main characteristic of Sensor Networks is that their nodes are 
untethered and unattended. These small sensor nodes could be deployed in industries 
such as transportation, health care, disaster recovery, warfare, security, and even space 
exploration. By connecting these small sensor nodes by radio links, the sensor nodes 
could perform tasks which traditional single sensor nodes are hard to match, e.g. 
detecting danger spots in a disaster area. Sensor networks are similar to Ad-hoc networks 
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in various aspects though they differ in some. Due to numerous constraints in Sensor 
Networks, they have various technical issues that are still being researched. 
1.2 Energy Limitations 
Each node in a sensor network may consist of one or more sensors, a low power 
radio, a portable power supply and possibly localization hardware or a GPS unit or some 
ranging device. Consequently, Sensor Networks are severely constrained by 
computational and energy resources. Also, because they are unattended and untethered in 
nature, these resources are practically non-replenishable. 
A routing protocol does the job of discovering routes between nodes. While 
establishment of correct and efficient routes is the primary goal, another challenging goal 
is to provide energy efficient routing protocols. This is important because each node has 
an operation time depending on its battery capacity and the lifetime of a node directly 
effects the lifetime of a network. 
1.3 Security Issue 
Sensor Networks are increasingly important in diverse areas, where the 
information transmitted is highly sensitive and should be protected from intrusions. The 
resource limitations of sensor networks, also makes them vulnerable to security attacks. 
Resource intensive computations such as complex cryptographic functions and resource 
utilization for lengthy and extensive communications are not feasible for sensor 
networks. Therefore the potential for intrusion, eavesdropping and other security attacks 
are greater than for typical wireless networks. 
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Thus, a need for securing the information is also a vital issue to be considered in 
Sensor Networks. The key to effectively protect a data transmission network against a 
wide range of attacks is a suite of mechanisms spanning several layers of the protocol 
stack. Routing is one area at network layer where such additional protection can be 
achieved by supplementing other security measures. 
Given the problems with sensor networks identified above, this thesis focuses on 
achieving power savings and security at the same time in routing protocols for sensor 
networks. Recent work has investigated both these issues from various viewpoints. This 
thesis is limited to the network layer routing solution to the problem. 
The organization of this Thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 provides a background on 
various topics relevant to the Thesis problem and the related work performed in those 
areas. The thesis statement in Chapter 3 lists the objectives of this work. Chapter 4 
proposes a solution/algorithm proposed for the thesis problem and explains it in detail. 
Chapter 5 shows all the simulations, describes the tools and system attributes used and 
elaborates the results. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and provides pointers for future 
work. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Background 
Figure I depicts a sensor network and its connection to a data processing center: 
Sensor nodes 
Data 
Sink 
Internet/ 
Satellite 
Figure 1: Sensor Network 
Data Processing Center 
Each sensor node typically consists of a sensing unit, a processmg unit, a 
transceiver unit and a power unit. It may also have additional application dependent 
components such as a location finding system, power generator and mobilizer. The 
protocol stack associated with sensors and sink nodes consists of the physical layer, data 
link layer, network layer, transport layer and application layer. All these layers span 
across three major issues: power management, mobility management and task 
management [12]. 
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Traditionally, effective power management to extend battery life is a critical issue 
m mobile computing (for example, Ad-hoc networks). In sensor environments, the 
difficulty of replacing sensor batteries exacerbates the problem. Power in sensors is used 
for more than one purpose: sensing, computing, and communication. Although the energy 
consumption rate for each type of operation is sensor and application specific, reseatch 
has shown that a sensor node's energy consumption for communication activities 
substantially exceeds that required for sensing and computation. Thus, power aware 
routing is a right direction to take, since it concentrates on power savings at the 
communication level. It is also important to note the replacing sensor batteries in the field 
is not a feasible option in many if not most applications. 
PlanetAnalog.com - an EE Times online community, which is the resource for 
analog and mixed/signal technology features up-to-the-minute news; exclusive user 
interviews, feature articles, commentary; and a regular online poll [10]. This website has 
stated in one of its headline articles on July 14, 2003 [ 11] as follows: "Against the 
backdrop of the war on terrorism, an expanding group of government researchers is at 
work on a nationwide sensor network that someday could provide a real-time early-
warning system for a wide array of chemical, biological and nuclear threats across the 
United States" and much more on it. 
Securing sensor networks should span multiple levels of the protocol stack, 
including the network routing level. Some security mechanisms can be applied at lower 
levels like the Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol which can be combined with 
techniques at higher levels thus attaining an integrated security scheme. Some of the 
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ideas that have been proposed and research in this area will be discussed briefly in the 
following sections. 
2.2 Power-Aware routing 
There are numerous routing algorithms and protocol ideas from traditional wired 
network systems and Ad-hoc systems. Some of them can be adapted for consideration for 
deployment in a sensor network. However, most of these protocols are more applicable 
for power aware routing than secure routing. Some of these protocols have been 
employed in a sensor network [2] [12]. Moreover, various security schemes, routing 
techniques and protocols are being proposed for sensor networks continuously as this is a 
new and rapidly developing area of technology. The rest of this chapter describes various 
approaches to routing and security in sensor network. 
2.2.1 Flooding: 
Flooding is an old technique that can also be used for routing. in sensor networks. 
In flooding, each node receiving a data or management packet and repeats it by 
broadcasting, unless a maximum number of hops for the packet is reached or the 
destination of the packet is the node itself. Flooding is a reactive technique, and it does 
not require costly topology maintenance and complex route discovery algorithms. 
However, it has several deficiencies such as [9]: 
• Implosion: Implosion is a situation where duplicated messages are sent to the same 
node. For example, if sensor node A has N neighbor sensor nodes that are also the 
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neighbors of sensor node B, sensor node B receives N copies of the message sent by 
sensor node A. 
• Overlap: If two nodes share the same observing region, both of them may sense the 
same stimuli at the same time. As a result, neighbor nodes receive duplicated messages. 
• Resource blindness: The flooding protocol does not take into account the available 
energy resources. Also, sending of messages redundantly due to the above two reasons 
means unnecessary depletion of energy form the sensor nodes. An energy resource aw~e 
protocol must take into account the amount of energy available to them at all times. This 
is an important consideration for sensor networks. 
2.2.2 Gossiping [7]: 
A derivation of flooding is gossiping in which nodes do not broadcast but send the 
incoming packets to a randomly selected neighbor. A sensor node randomly selects one 
of its neighbors to send the data. Once the neighbor node receives the data, it randomly 
selects another sensor node. Although this approach avoids the implosion problem by just 
having one copy of a message at any node, it takes a long time to propagate the message 
to all sensor nodes. Eventually a node with a route to the destination may be reached. The 
gossiping can stop at this point. Although this approach is slow, it is energy efficient. 
2.2.3 Energy-efficient routes [12]: 
There are three major issues involved in energy aware routing protocols [2]: 
1) The goal is to find the path that either minimizes the absolute power consumed or 
balances the energy consumption of all mobile nodes. Balanced energy consumption 
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does not necessarily lead to minimized energy consumption, but it keeps a certain 
node from being overloaded and thus ensures longer network lifetime. Energy 
balance can be achieved indirectly by distributing network traffic [2]. 
2) Energy awareness has been implemented at the routing layer with help from other 
layers such as MAC or application layer. Information from MAC layer is beneficial 
because it usually supports power saving features that the routing protocols can 
exploit to provide better energy efficiency [2]. 
3) Some routing protocols assume that transmission power is controllable and nodes' 
location information is available (e.g., via GPS - Global Positioning Systems). Under 
these assumptions, the problem of finding a path with least consumed power becomes 
a conventional optimization problem on a graph were the weighted link cost 
corresponds to the transmission power required for transmitting a packet between two 
nodes of the link [2]. 
F (PA= 4) 
Figure 2 [12]: Energy Efficient Routes. 
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Energy-efficient routes can be found based on the available power (PA) in the 
nodes or the energy required ( a) for transmission in the links along the routes. The 
authors of [12] (Ian F. Akyildiz, Weilian Su, Yogesh Sankarasubramaniam, Erdal 
Cayirci) have described their network as shown in Figure 2 with specific values of a and 
PA. Here, the node T is one of the source sensor nodes ( or an ad-hoc node) that senses 
the phenomena. 
Assuming that a stands for unit energy consumption per node, T has the following 
possible routes to communicate with the sink: 
• Route 1: Sink-A-B-T, total PA= 4, total a= 3 
• Route 2: Sink-A-B-C-T, total PA= 6, total a= 6 
• Route 3: Sink-D-T, total PA= 3, total a= 4 
• Route 4: Sink-E-F-T, total PA= 5, total a= 6 
An energy-efficient route is selected by one of the following approaches. 
Maximum PA route: The route that has maximum total PA is preferred. The total PA is 
calculated by summing the P As of each node along the route. Based on this approach, 
route 2 is selected in Fig. 2. However, route 2 includes the nodes in route 1 and an extra 
node. Therefore, although it has a higher total PA, it is not power-efficient. As a result, it 
is important not to consider routes derived by extending routes that can connect the 
sensor node to the sink as an alternative route. Eliminating route 2, we select route 4 as 
our power-efficient route when we use the maximum PA scheme. 
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Minimum energy (ME) route: The route that consumes minimum energy to transmit the 
data packets between the sink and the sensor node is the ME route. As shown in Fig. 2, 
route 1 is the ME route. 
Minimum hop (MB) route: The route that makes the minimum hop to reach the sink is 
preferred. Route 3 in Fig. 2 is the most efficient route based on this scheme. Note that the 
ME scheme selects the same route as the MH when the same amount of energy (i.e., all a 
are the same) is used on every link. Therefore, when nodes broadcast with same power 
level without any power control, MH is then equivalent to ME. 
Maximum minimum PA node route: The route along which the minimum PA is larger 
than the minimum P As of the other routes is preferred. In Fig. 2, route 3 is the most 
efficient and route 1 is the second most efficient. This scheme precludes the risk of using 
up a sensor node with low PA much earlier than the others because they are on a route 
with nodes that have very high P As. 
2.2.4 Power Aware Routing Protocol: This suggests the use of different metrics when 
determining a routing path. Instead of shortest routing path between the source and the 
destination, the following metrics may be used [15]: 
• Minimizing energy consumed per packet: This is a good metric, but has the 
disadvantage of unfairly burdening certain nodes that might get drained of battery 
energy finally resulting in link disconnection and network partitioning. 
• Maximizing time to Network partition: This one directly addresses the network 
lifetime. 
The following three metrics indirectly address the network lifetime. 
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• Minimizing variance in node power levels 
• Minimizing cost/packet 
• Minimizing maximum node cost 
2.2.5 Alternate Path Routing Protocol (APR): This indirectly balances energy 
consumption by distributing network traffic among a set of diverse paths for the same 
source-destination pair, called an alternate route set. APR's performance greatly depends 
on the quality of the alternate route set [2], which can be measured by route coupling, 
i.e., how many nodes and links two routes have in common. 
2.2.6 Localized Energy Aware Routing Protocol: This protocol directly controls the 
energy consumption and. achieves balanced energy consumption among all participating 
mobile nodes [2]. The route discovery involves flooding of route-request messages. 
When a routing path is searched, each mobile node relies on local information on 
remaining battery level to decide whether or not to participate in the selection process of 
the routing path. An energy-lacking node can conserve its battery power by not 
forwarding data packets on behalf of others. The decision-making process here is 
distributed to all relevant nodes, and the destination node does not need to wait or block 
itself in order to find most energy-efficient path. 
2.2. 7 Flow Augmentation Routing Protocol: This maximizes the network lifetime by 
balancing the traffic among the nodes in proportion to their energy reserves [2]. The 
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traffic balance; in turn, can be achieved by selecting the optimal transmission power 
levels and optimal route. 
2.2.8 Online Max-Min Routing Protocol (OOM): The data transmission sequence ( or 
data generation rate) is not usually known in advance. Without requiring that informatio~ 
the OOM protocol makes routing decision that optimizes two different metrics: 
minimizing power consumption and maximizing the minimal residual power in the nodes 
of the network [15]. Given the power level information of all nodes and the power cost 
between two neighboring nodes, this algorithm first finds the path that minimizes the 
Power consumption (Pmin) by using Dijkstra's algorithm. Among the power efficient 
paths with some tolerance (less than zPmin, were z>= 1) it selects the best path that 
optimizes the second metric by iterative application of Dijkstra's algorithm with edge 
removals. 
2.2.9 Power-Aware Localized Routing Protocol: Assuming that the location 
information of its neighbors and the destination are available through GPS, each node 
selects one of its neighbors through which the overall transmission power to the 
destination is minimized [15] [2]. Since the transmission power needed for direct 
communication between two nodes is super linear dependency on distance, it is usually 
energy efficient to transmit packets via intermediate nodes. 
2.2.10 SP AN Protocol: This operates between the routing layer and the MAC layer 
trying to exploit the MAC layers power-saving features in its routing decision [2]. The 
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basic idea of the MAC layers' power-saving mechanism is to power down (sleep) the 
radio device when it has no data to transmit or receive. This allows substantial energy 
savings since sleep operation consumes less power. The master node must be awake all 
the time. In SP AN, each node periodically determines whether it should become a master 
or not based on the following master eligibility rule: If two of its neighbors cannot reach 
each other either directly or via one or two masters, it should become a master. 
2.2.11 Geographic Adaptive Fidelity Protocol (GAF): GAF identifies many redundant 
nodes with respect to routing and turns them off without sacrificing the routing fidelity 
[2]. All nodes are in one of three states: sleeping, discovering, and active. 
2.2.12 Data-centric routing [12]: 
Routing may be based on the data-centric approach. Directed diffusion [12] is a data-
centric protocol for sensor network applications. It achieves some level of energy savings 
by selecting empirically good paths, and by caching and processing data in-network. 
Rumor routing [13] is one highly data-centric routing mechanism which allows queries to 
be delivered to events in the network. In data-centric routing, interest dissemination is 
performed to assign the sensing tasks to the sensor nodes. There are two approaches used 
for interest dissemination: sinks broadcast the interest [4], and sensor nodes broadcast an 
advertisement for the available data [9] and wait for a request from the interested nodes. 
Data-centric routing requires attribute-based naming [5]. For attribute based naming, the 
users are more interested in querying an attribute of the phenomenon, rather than 
querying an individual node. For instance, "the areas where the temperature is over 
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70°F'' is a more common query than "the temperature read by a certain node." Attribute-
based naming is used to carry out queries by using the attributes of the phenomenon. 
Attribute-based naming also makes broadcasting, attribute-based multicasting, and 
geocasting important for sensor networks. 
Data aggregation is a technique used to solve the implosion and overlap problems 
in data-centric routing [9]. In this technique, a sensor network is usually perceived as a 
reverse multicast tree, as shown in Figure 3 [12], where the sink asks the sensor nodes to 
report the ambient condition of the phenomena. Data coming from multiple sensor nodes 
are aggregated as if they are about the same attribute of the phenomenon when they reach 
the same routing node on the way back to the sink. 
Figure 3: Data Aggregation 
For example, sensor node E aggregates the data from sensor nodes A and B while 
sensor node F aggregates the data from sensor nodes C and D, as shown in Fig. 3. Data 
aggregation can be perceived as a set of automated methods of combining the data that 
comes from many sensor nodes into a set of meaningful infonnation [8]. 
In this respect, data aggregation is known as data fusion [9]. Also, care must be 
taken when aggregating data, because the specifics of the data (e.g., the locations of 
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reporting sensor nodes) should not be left out. Such specifics may be needed by certain 
applications. 
2.3 Secure Routing 
2.3.1 Multi-tiered security architecture [6]: 
Key attributes of wireless micro sensor networks are the severely constrained 
computational and energy resources, and an ad hoc operational environment. Resource 
limitations and specific architecture of sensor networks call for customized security 
mechanisms. A communication security scheme has been proposed where for each type 
of data a corresponding security mechanism was defined [6]. By employing a multi-tiered 
security architecture where each mechanism has different resource requirements, efficient 
resource management can be done, which is essential for wireless sensor networks. This 
approach to communication security in sensor networks is based on the principle that the 
data items must be protected to a degree consistent with their value. Types of data sent 
through the network can be differentiated into three: 
1. Mobile code 
2. Locations of sensor nodes 
3. Application specific data 
The deployment of security mechanisms in a sensor network creates additional 
overhead. Not only does latency increase due to the execution of the security related 
procedures, but also the consumed energy directly decreases the lifetime of the network. 
To minimize the security related costs, security overhead, and consequently the energy 
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consumption, should correspond to sensitivity of the encrypted information. Following 
the taxonomy of the types of data the network, three security levels are defined in [ 6]: 
• Security level I is reserved for mobile code, the most sensitive information sent 
through the network [ 6]. 
• Security level II is dedicated to the location information conveyed in messages [6]. · 
• Security level III mechanism is applied to the application specific information [ 6]. 
Security level I allows the use of strong encryption in spite of the resulting 
overhead. To constrain the damage only to one part of the network, location-based keys 
are proposed for level Il encryption. The location-based keys enable separation between 
regions where the location of nodes are compromised and the areas where nodes continue 
to operate safely. The application specific data is encrypted using a weaker encryption 
that requires lower computational overhead. Thus, high frequency of messages with 
application specific data prevents the. usage of stronger resource consuming encryption. 
2.3.2 SPINS (SNEP and µTESLA) [1]: 
Security Protocols for Sensor Networks [SPINS] was introduced in [I]. It is 
comprised of two protocols: Sensor Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) [ 1] and 
µ TESLA [I]. The function of SNEP is to provide: 
a) Confidentiality: Eavesdroppers should not be able to determine what information the 
sensors are sending back to the base station. 
b) Authentication: It should not be possible for an adversary to spoof messages as though 
they were coming from either nodes or the base station. 
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c) Integrity: Authentication usually implies integrity since it will be difficult for an 
adversary to modify a signed message, and maintain the signature while modifying the 
data. It can also mean that if the message is modified by "noise," the signature is still 
intact. 
d) Freshness: It should be clear to the base station or the nodes what messages are 
current, and which are old. 
In a SPINS sensor network all unicast communications either from the base 
station to a node or from a node to the base station rely on SNEP [1]. In SNEP, each 
node has a different key, which it shares with the base station. This provides both 
confidentiality and authentication. To ensure freshness each node also maintains a 
counter with the base station. It uses this counter as the initialization vector for the stream 
cipher used, which is RCS [10]. Whenever a message is sent from either the base station 
to a node i or from a node i to the base station, the ith counter is incremented. Thus, the 
node can know the order in which messages arrived from the base station. 
If some messages· are lost, then the node can try decrypting with counter values 
around the current counter value it has stored. If it cannot decrypt the message, then it 
will need to resynchronize the counter with the base station. In each node two keys are 
generated from the key shared with the base station. That is if node i has key Ki it shares 
with the base station, then it generates and sends Ki,encr and Ki,mac to the base station. 
K.i,encr is used for confidentiality, Ki,mac is used for message authentication. 
For authentication, a message authentication code or MAC is used. Since node i 
only shares its particular Ki,mac with the base station, the base station knows that any 
message encrypted with that particular Ki,mac must have originated from node i. 
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Likewise in the case that node i is receiving a message encrypted with Ki,mac, node i 
knows that it must have originated from the base station. In the case of SPINS, in order to 
save memory space on the nodes, the MAC is just the same as the encryption algorithm: 
RCS. 
A message sent from either the base station to node i or from node i to the base 
station consists of the following: 
A-. B: {D}<Kencr,C>, MAC(Kmac, {D}<Kencr,C>) 
The data is sent encrypted with Kencr using as an initialization vector, the counter C. The 
MAC is computed using key Kmac and plaintext {D}<Kencr, C>· Although it is possible to 
know which messages came in which order from either the base station or node i, it is not 
possible to know whether a message originated in response to a specific request from the 
base station. To enable this, the base station sends a random bit string or nonce with each 
request it sends to node i. When node i is responding to that request, it includes the 
random bit string in its response so the base station knows that it is responding to that 
request. 
µTESLA provides authentication to data broadcasts [1]. Authenticated broadcasts 
cannot be done with SNEP because if every node getting the broadcast knows the same 
key, then any node could pretend as the base station. The problem would be easy if the 
base station could securely distribute its public key and then just sign all its messages 
with its private key using a public key cryptosystem like in [11]. The problem is that 
asymmetric cryptography is too computationally intensive for the devices. 
In µ TESLA protocol, the base station calculates a key chain i.e., it generates some 
key Kn, and then using a one way hash function F, it calculates F{Kn) = Kn-1, F(Kn-1) = 
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Kn-2 ..... F(Kl) =KO.It sends to all the nodes KO (it can use SNEP to do this). All the 
nodes are time synchronized with the base station. The protocol is that at periodic 
intervals the keys Kl, K.2, .... Kn are broadcast. Say at tl, Kl is revealed, at t2, K2 is 
revealed, and at ti, Ki is revealed. In the span tO to tl all packets broadcast by the base 
station are encrypted with Kl. The nodes cannot decrypt it because they do not know Kl. 
However, once Kl is revealed they can be certain it came from the base station, because 
only the base station knows Kl and they can verify that F(Kl) = KO. If any imposter 
broadcasts a message mi encrypted with key K'i and then broadcasts the key K'i the nodes 
would know that it is an imposter because F(K'i) would not equal Ki-I. 
2.3.3 Secure Routing-Attacks and Counter measures [3]: 
Crippling attacks against all the major routing protocols for sensor networks are 
presented in detail and countenneasures suggested in [3]. Two classes of novel attacks 
against sensor networks - sinkholes and HELLO floods are also introduced. The authors 
claim this to be the first such· analysis of secure routing in sensor networks. 
Security of all major sensor network routing protocols were analyzed. Because 
these protocols have not been designed with security as a goal, it is not surprising that 
they are all insecure. However, this is non-trivial to fix: it is unlikely a sensor network 
routing protocol can be made secure by incorporating security mechanisms after design 
has completed. The authors assert that sensor network routing protocols must be designed 
with security in mind, and this is the only effective solution for secure routing in sensor 
networks. The rest of this section describes the various attacks and countermeasures as 
suggested by [3]. 
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Many sensor network routing protocols are quite simple, and for this reason are 
sometimes even more susceptible to attacks against general ad-hoc routing protocols. 
Most network layer attacks against sensor networks fall into one of the following 
categories: 
• Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information 
• Selective forwarding 
• Sinkhole attacks 
• Sybil attacks 
• Wormholes 
• HELLO flood attacks 
• Acknowledgement spoofing 
Attacks: 
A. Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information 
The most direct attack against a routing protocol is to· target the routing 
information exchanged between nodes. By spoofing, altering, or replaying routing 
information, adversaries may be able to create routing loops, attract or repel network 
traffic, extend or shorten source routes, generate false error messages, partition the 
network, increase end-to-end latency, etc. 
B. Selective forwarding 
Multi-hop networks are often based on the assumption that participating nodes 
will faithfully forward the received messages. In a selective fotwarding attack, malicious 
nodes may refuse to fotward certain messages and simply drop them, ensuring that they 
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are not propagated any further. A simple form of this attack is when a malicious node 
behaves like a black hole and refuses to forward every packet she sees. However, such an 
attacker runs the risk that neighboring nodes will conclude that she has failed and decides 
to seek another route. A more subtle form of this attack is when an adversary selectively 
f 0 rwards packets. An adversary interested in suppressing or modifying packets 
originating from a select few nodes can reliably forward the remaining traffic and limit 
suspicion of her wrongdoing. 
C. Sinkhole attacks 
In a sinkhole attack, the adversary's goal is to lure nearly all the traffic from a 
Particular area through a compromised node, creating a metaphorical sinkhole with the 
adversary at the center. Because nodes on, or near, the path that packets follow have 
many opportunities to tamper with application data, sinkhole attacks can enable many 
0ther attacks (selective forwarding, for example). 
Sinkhole attacks typically work by making a compromised node look especially 
attractive to surrounding nodes with respect to the routing algorithm. For instance, an 
adversary could spoof or replay an advertisement for an extremely high quality route to a 
base station. Some protocols might actually try to verify the quality of route with end-to-
end acknowledgements containing reliability or latency information. In this case, a 
laptop-class adversary with a powerful transmitter can actually provide a high quality 
route by transmitting with enough power to reach the base station in a single hop, or by 
using a Wonnhole attack. 
Due to either the real or imagined high quality route through the compromised 
node, it is likely each neighboring node of the adversary will forward packets destined for 
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a base station through the adversary, and also propagate the attractiveness of the route to 
its neighbors. Effectively, the adversary creates a large "sphere of influence", attracting 
all traffic destined for a base station from nodes several hops away from the 
compromised node. 
D. The Sybil attack 
In a Sybil attack [14], a single node presents multiple identities to other nodes in 
the network. The Sybil attack can significantly reduce the effectiveness of fault-tolerant 
schemes such as distributed storage, dispersity and multipath routing, and topology 
maintenance. Replicas, storage partitions, or routes believed to be using disjoint nodes 
could in actuality be using a single adversary presenting multiple identities. 
E. Wormholes 
In the wormhole attack [ 6], an adversary tunnels messages received in one part of 
the network over a low latency link and replays them in a different part. The simplest 
instance of this attack is a single node situated between two other nodes forwarding 
messages between the two of them. However, wormhole attacks more commonly involve 
two distant malicious nodes colluding to understate their distance from each other by 
relaying packets along an out-of-bound channel available only to the attacker. An 
adversary situated close to a base station may be able to completely disrupt routing by 
creating a well-placed wormhole. An adversary could convince nodes who would 
normally be multiple hops from a base station that they are only one or two hops away 
via the wormhole. This can create a sinkhole: since the adversary on the other side of the 
wormhole can artificially provide a high-quality route to the base station, potentially all 
traffic in the surrounding area will be drawn through her if alternate routes are 
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significantly less attractive. This will most likely always be the case when the endpoint of 
the wormhole is relatively far from a base station. Wormholes can also be used simply to 
convince two distant nodes that they are neighbors by relaying packets between the two 
of them. Wormhole attacks would likely be used in combination with selective 
forwarding or eavesdropping. Detection is potentially difficult when used in conjunction 
with the Sybil attack. 
F. HELLO flood attack 
The authors of [3] introduce a novel attack against sensor networks: the HELLO 
flood. Many protocols require nodes to broadcast HELLO packets to announce 
themselves to their neighbors, and a node receiving such a packet may assume that it is 
within (normal) radio range of the sender. This assumption may be false: a laptop-class 
attacker broadcasting routing or other information with large enough transmission power 
could convince every node in the network that the adversary is its neighbor. For example, 
an adversary advertising a very high quality route to the base station to every node in the 
network could cause a large number of nodes to attempt to use this ro~te, but those nodes 
sufficiently far away from the adversary would be sending packets into oblivion. The 
network is left in a state of confusion. A node realizing the link to the adversary is false 
could be left with few options: all its neighbors might be attempting to forward packets to 
the adversary as well. Protocols, which depend on localized information exchange 
between neighboring nodes for topology maintenance or flow control, are also subject to 
this attack. An adversary does not necessarily need to be able to construct legitimate 
traffic in order to use the HELLO flood attack. She can simply re-broadcast overhead 
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packets with enough power to be received by every node in the network. HELLO floods 
can also be thought of as one-way, broadcast wormholes. 
G. Acknowledgement spoofing 
Several sensor network routing algorithms rely on implicit or explicit link layer 
acknowledgements. Due to the inherent broadcast medium, an adversary can spoof link 
layer acknowledgments for "overheard" packets addressed to neighboring nodes. Goals 
include convincing the sender that a weak link is strong or that a dead or disabled node is 
alive. For example, a routing protocol may select the next hop in a path using link 
reliability. Artificially reinforcing a weak or dead link is a subtle way of manipulating 
such a scheme. Since packets sent along weak or dead links are lost, an adversary can 
effectively mount a selective forwarding attack using acknowledgement spoofing by 
encouraging the target node to transmit packets on those links. 
Countermeasures: 
A. Outsider attacks and link layer security 
The majority of outsider attacks against sensor network routing protocols can be 
prevented by simple link layer encryption and authentication using a globally shared key. 
The Sybil attack is no longer relevant because nodes are unwilling to accept even a single 
identity of the adversary. The majority of selective forwarding and sinkhole attacks are 
not possible because the adversary is prevented from joining the topology. 
Link layer acknowledgements can now be authenticated. Major classes of attacks not 
countered by link layer encryption and authentication mechanisms are wormhole attacks 
and HELLO flood attacks. Although an adversary is prevented from joining the network, 
nothing prevents her from using a wormhole to tunnel packets sent by legitimate nodes in 
24 
one part of the network to legitimate nodes in another part to convince them they are 
neighbors or by amplifying an overheard broadcast packet with sufficient power to be 
received by every node in the network. 
B. The Sybil attack 
An insider cannot be prevented from participating in the network, but she should 
only be able to do so using the identities of the nodes she has compromised. Using a 
globally shared key allows an insider to masquerade as any (possibly even nonexistent) 
node. Identities must be verified. In the traditional setting, this might be done using 
public key cryptography, but generating and verifying digital signatures is beyond the 
capabilities of sensor nodes. One solution is to have every node share a unique symmetric 
key with a trusted base station. Two nodes can then use a protocol to verify each other's 
identity and establish a shared key. A pair of neighboring nodes can use the resulting key 
to implement an authenticated, encrypted link between them. In order to prevent an 
insider from wandering around a stationary network and establishing shared keys with 
every node in the network, the base station can reasonably limit the number of neighbors 
a node is allowed to have and send an error message when a node exceeds it. 
Thus, when a node is compromised, it is restricted to (meaningfully) 
communicating only with its verified neighbors. This not to say that nodes are forbidden 
from sending messages base stations or aggregation points multiple hops away, but they 
are restricted from using any node except their verified neighbors to do so. In addition, an 
adversary can still use a wormhole to create an artificial link between two nodes to 
convince them they are neighbors, but the adversary will not able to eavesdrop on or 
modify any future communications between them. 
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HELLO flood attacks: 
The simplest defense against HELLO flood attacks is to verify the bidirectionality 
of a link before talcing meaningful action based on a message received over that link. The 
identity verification protocol described in the previous section is sufficient to prevent 
HELLO flood attacks. Not only does it verify the bidirectionality of the link between two 
nodes, but even if a well-funded adversary had a highly sensitive receiver or had 
wormholes to a multiple locations in the network, a trusted base station that limits the 
number of verified neighbors for each node will still prevent HELLO flood attacks on 
large segments of the network when a small number of nodes have been compromised. 
Wormhole and sinkhole attacks: 
Wormhole and sinkhole attacks are very difficult to defend against, especially 
when the two are used in combination. Wormholes are hard to detect because they use a 
private, out-of-band channel invisible to the underlying sensor network. Sinkholes are 
difficult to defend against in protocols that use advertised information such as remaining 
energy or estimate of end-to-end reliability to construct a routing topology because this 
information is hard to verify. Routes that minimize the hop-count to a base station are 
easier to verify, however hop-count can be completely misrepresented through wormhole. 
When routes are established simply based on the reception of a packet, sinkholes are easy 
to create because there is no information for a defender to verify. A technique for 
detecting wormhole attacks is presented [13], but it requires extremely tight time 
synchronization and is thus infeasible for most sensor networks. Because is extremely 
difficult to retrofit existing protocols with defenses against these attacks, the best solution 
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1s to carefully design routing protocols m which wormholes and sinkholes are 
meaningless. 
E. Leveraging global knowledge 
A significant challenge in securing large sensor networks is their inherent self-
organizing, decentralized nature. When the network size is limited or the topology is well 
structured or controlled, global knowledge can be leveraged in security mechanisms. 
Consider a relatively small network of around 100 nodes or less. If it can be assumed that 
no nodes are compromised during deployment, then after the initial topology is formed, 
each node could send information such as neighboring nodes and its geographic location 
(if known) back to a base station. Using this information, the base station(s) can map the 
topology of the entire network. To account for topology changes due to radio interference 
or node failure, nodes would periodically update a base station with the appropriate 
information. Drastic or suspicious changes to the topology might indicate a node 
compromise, and the appropriate action can be taken. 
F. Selective forwarding 
Even in protocols completely resistant to sinkholes, wormholes, and the Sybil 
attack, a compromised node has a significant probability of including itself on a data flow 
to launch a selective forwarding attack if it is strategically located near the source or a 
base station. Multipath routing can be used to counter these types of selective forwarding 
attacks. Messages routed over n paths whose nodes are completely disjoint are 
completely protected against selective forwarding attacks involving at most n 
compromised nodes and still offer some probabilistic protection when over n nodes are 
compromised. However, completely disjoint paths may be difficult to create. Braided 
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paths may have nodes in common, but have no links in common (i.e., no two consecutive 
nodes in common). The use of multiple b.raided paths may provide probabilistic 
protection against selective forwarding and use only localized information. Allowing 
nodes to dynamically choose a packet's next hop probabilistically from a set of possible 
candidates can further reduce the chances of an adversary gaining complete control of a 
data flow. 
G. Authenticated broadcast and flooding 
Since base stations are trustworthy, adversaries must not be able to spoof 
broadcast or flooded messages from any base station. This requires some level of 
asymmetry: since every node in the network can potentially be compromised, no node 
should be able to spoof messages from a base station, yet every node should be able to 
verify them. Authenticated broadcast is also useful for localized node interactions. Many 
protocols require nodes to broadcast HELLO messages to their neighbors. These 
messages should be authenticated and impossible to spoof. 
H. Countermeasure summary 
Link-layer encryption and authentication, multipath routing, identity verification, 
bidirectional link verification, and authenticated broadcast can protect sensor network 
routing protocols against outsiders, bogus routing information, Sybil attacks, HELLO 
floods, and acknowledgement spoofing, and it is feasible to augment existing protocols 
with these mechanisms. Sinkhole attacks and wormholes pose significant challenges to 
secure routing protocol design, and it is unlikely that there exist effective 
countermeasures against these attacks that can be applied after the design of a protocol 
has completed. It is crucial to design routing protocols in which these attacks are 
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meaningless or ineffective. Geographic routing protocols are one class of protocols that 
holds promise. 
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Chapter 3 
THESIS STATEMENT 
This thesis investigates the problems of power consumption and security in sensor 
networks with respect to routing. While providing a routing algorithm that caters to any 
of these factors is a nontrivial exercise, the dual factors create more complexity. But as 
described in the previous chapter, it is difficult to fix a protocol after it is designed or 
implemented. So, the main objectives of this thesis are: 
1. To propose a Secure, Energy- Efficient algorithm for Sensor networks. 
2. Evaluate the effectiveness of these secure protocols. 
3. Suggest other existing security schemes that can be applied at other levels in the 
network to maximize the effect. 
Though most of the existing security schemes for sensor networks are application 
specific, the approach here is purely application independent and can be applied for 
routing in sensor networks in general. Also, as emphasized in the previous chapter, it is 
always good to combine security schemes at various levels to obtain best results. So, an 
attempt has been made to make suggestions on some future work as to what other 
existing schemes can be combined with the proposed solution. 
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Chapter4 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Wireless sensor networks are an evolving area of technology and research. These 
are being deployed in areas where communication security is highly crucial. The 
information transferred through a sensor network can be about weather conditions, the 
presence of toxins in the environment, structural soundness of buildings during/after an 
earthquake, and the progression of hazards such as fires to direct evacuation of building 
occupants or guide firefighters. The Department of Defense is particularly interested in 
the security of these networks. 
Our objective is to design and develop a Secure, Energy-Efficient routing 
algorithm for sensor networks in this thesis, with routing security and power balance in 
the network as main criteria under consideration. There are other considerations also, 
which will be explained in their specific contexts. An aim is that our secure data should 
not be tracked or tapped by an adversary. 
Game theory [13] presents one possible solution to our problem. The security 
problem may be viewed as a game between two players - the designer of the routing 
algorithm and the attacker who attempts to intersect packets. In the approach considered 
in [ 13], the designer wants to minimize the time it takes for a packet to be safely 
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transmitted, whereas the attacker wants to minimize this time, so that the attacker has 
more time to intercept. Although our approach is driven by the work of Hespanha and 
Bobacek [ 13] who consider routing games, our proposed solution is not a formal 
derivation based on game theory. Our approach provides a solution to secure routing that 
is approximately based on the work reported in [13]. 
The cost to be minimized by the designer of the routing algorithm and maximized 
by the attacker is J(e) := E[x,(e)], where E ~ 0 is a design parameter and x(e) is a randqm 
variable that is equal to (1 +e)'-1 if the packet is intercepted at the tth hop and O otherwise. 
Therefore this approach discourages long paths and will favor short paths. In other words, 
for E ;c 0, J(e) bias the solution sought by the player that designs the routing policy 
towards shorter paths since, when being caught is inevitable, it incurs in less cost if it is 
caught sooner than later. For E = 0, the random variable x,(e) is equal to 1 if the packet is 
intercepted and O otherwise and therefore J(O) is simply the probability that the packet 
will be intercepted. The cost J(O) assumes that all paths are equal. Clearly, as formulated 
above, it is too simplistic to model a realistic attack. 
Consider a data transmission network with nodes N := {1,2, .. . ,n} connected by 
unidirectional links. We denote by L the set of all links and use the notation j ~ i to 
represent a link from node j to node i. Without loss of generality, the source and 
destinations nodes can be taken to be 1 and n, respectively. Hespanha [13] considers 
stochastic routing policies where under such policies, whenever a packet arrives at node k 
€ N, it will be routed through link k -+ i € L with probability rk-+ i ~ 0. In our approach 
as far as the routing is concerned, each routing policy is characterized by a list R :={r, : 1 
€ L} that satisfies 
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Ek: i-+k CL r;-1-k = Cm, 'vi€ N 
where Cm is a constant for the mth iteration. In our proposed solution we consider both 
power and probability of a route going through a node ( considering its selection history). 
Cm= 1 if we consider only routing probability, in other words, the probabilities of the 
links input to a node will be 1. Therefore Cm is an indication of the node's remaining 
power and the routing probability. In [13] they restrict their attention to stochastic cycle-
free routing policies. These are stochastic routing policies for which a packet will not 
return to a node where it has been before with probability one. We denote by Rnocycte the 
set of lists with this property. 
Similarly an attacker will have an attack policy. An attacker stochastic policy 
D = {d, : E1 d, = 1, 1 € L} which simply consists of a distribution over the elements of L, 
where d, is the probability that the adversary will attempt to intercept packets in the link 
/. We need to determine a security policy R *( E) such that 
J*(e) := min R c Rnocycle max D={ di} JRD(e). = max D={ di} JR*(&)D(E), 
where JRD(E) denotes the value of the cost J(e) incurred when the routing policy R is used 
and the attacker selects the policy D. We assume that we are not aware of the attacker's 
policy. Our objective therefore is to minimize J*(e) := min R E:Rnocycle JRD(E). 
Finding the minimum will always result in the shortest path. Our routing policy 
takes into account both security and power. Our routing policy aims to consider both the 
previous selection of a node and power available for the node. Our objective therefore is 
to maximize J*(e) := max R € Rnocycle f (PS(e) ·PA{e)) where PS and PA are previous 
selection of a node and power available respectively, f is a function and in our case we 
choose E to be a node. 
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Although not strictly stochastic, the algorithm chooses multiple routes which 
brings in unpredictability of routing and also avoiding frequently repeating routes. 
However, the routing is not just based on some chance random numbers. The algorithm 
also always achieves balanced energy consumption. The algorithm aims to minimize the 
effectiveness of user attacks. Our algorithm is therefore an approximate implementation 
of the ideas behind game theory. 
The algorithm is proposed by considering various factors both at the time of 
creation of the route and at the selection of the routes for packet transmissions. At the 
stage of creation of routes the two factors taken into account are how many times a node 
is selected previously for route and the remaining power level of the node. At the stage of 
selection of the complete routes for packet transfers, the two factors taken into account 
are the length of the route and the selection history of the route. Also, the final routes 
selected will not be directly used in the generated sequence for additional security 
benefit. Pre-calculated route pattern is kept aside and stochastically a random route from 
the pattern is selected to minimize the possibility that an adversary c~ detect patterns out 
of our routes. 
The assumptions of the algorithm are: 
• Each sensor node has its location information and its neighbors' with the help of a 
GPS system or a location tracking system. 
• Each node forms a cluster were it is the cluster head. The cluster is simply the set of 
nodes reachable from cluster head. This does not incur a big overhead given a handy 
Global Positioning System. 
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• Location information is updated periodically at reasonable intervals. Location 
information is fairly precise (with little or no approximation) and reliable between 
update intervals. 
• Each of the sensor nodes can act as a Source and the destination node D is the sink 
node. 
• Destination D can send a request for a message. This request can be sent is regular 
(insecure) mode. Interception of this request should not pose a compromise to the 
secure message itself, because we assume the attacker is aware of a secure message 
being sent from S to D. 
• The message is decomposed by S into a number of packets. The decomposition 
process embeds redundancy ( e.g., parity) so that only p packets are needed to 
reconstruct the message. The message is compromised if at least p packets are 
intercepted. 
• D determines the number of routes (paths) R needed for secure routing of the sensor 
information message. 
• Each route i carries the following values with it: 
- Lj = Route Length of route j. 
- Sj = Number of previous selections ofroutej. 
• Each node i carries the following values with it: 
- Ip = Remaining power level of itself and al its neighbors. 
- Isel = Number of times the node is selected in the route discovery algorithm and the 
same information about its neighbors. 
- The partial route for which it is a head node. 
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- A set of all the nodes on all the paths 
- The entire set of computed routes if the node is a source node. 
Let 
hi : The set of cluster heads that cover node i. 
ni : The number of cluster heads that cover node i. 
A : The set of nodes that are on any route. 
r : The number of initial paths that might be needed to obtain R. 
Secure, Energy-Efficient Route Discovery Algorithm executing at S for each message: 
I. A= {D} 
2. Randomly select 75% of nodes from among Di and from this set select r nodes with 
highest values of ((1/ ise1) X ip). 
3. Connect these nodes to D. These are now the heads of r paths to D 
4. Add these nodes to A 
5. Loop for each head node of path i 
a. If the head is S, add the entire path to Rand ext this loop. Otherwise continue 
b. Select randomly a cluster head node of i from half of the set ofhi, the half set 
being those nodes with highest values of ( ( 1/ isei) X ip). 
c. If the head is already in A, then select another from hi. Ifhi is empty, then remove 
this incomplete path this path fails to connect Sand D. 
d. Connect the head to path i. 
e. Remove old head node and insert new head node to A. 
Sending sensor data packets 
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6. Compute and select p routes (for each of the p packets) from R with highest value of 
(1/ Lj) X (1/ Sj) of the routes and add them to a set P. 
7. For each of the p packets: 
a. Randomly select a route from P. 
b. Send this packet over this path. Route information is stored in the packet that may 
be used for authentication at other levels of the network. 
c. Node information of each node on the route is adjusted based on the remaining 
power level after message transmission 
d. If a node falls below the "threshold" power level 
1. It is dropped out of the network and the route is removed for this message 
transmission. 
u. All its occurrences in set Pare removed and replaced with another route 
from R with highest value of (1/ Lj) X (1/ Sj). 
e. Remove this route from the set P. 
(Note that by the time all packets are successfully transmitted over the network to the 
sink node, the set P should be empty) 
Introduction of Step-6 in the algorithm has great significance by itself. It makes 
sure that even when the dual criteria of highest probability routing and balanced energy 
transfer demands specific routes, we would pre-calculate those routes and use them in a 
stochastic manner so that repetition is not seen, which means that an adversary would not 
be able to decipher the information of any message unless p packets are compromised. 
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It should be specifically noted here that the probability factors involved in steps 2, 
5(b) and 7(a) are selected for convenience, good understanding and simulation purposes. 
In actuality, these probability factors may be complex functions of remaining power level 
of the nodes, length of the routes, number of times a node is used in route selection 
process, number of times a route is used (based on what the pattern is of the recently used 
routes) etc. So, the proposed algorithm may be used in a much customized manner when 
used in real world secure energy-efficient sensor network applications. 
Complexity Analysis of the algorithm: 
When there are n nodes in the network, the complexity of the algorithm is O(n). 
At the beginning of the route discovery in the sensor network, the algorithm starts at the 
destination D and processes all of the other (n-1) nodes. It determines which of them are 
its neighbors and depending on the constraints and conditions described in the algorithm 
above, and decides on how many routes are required and thus proceeds to the rest of the 
algorithm to complete each route. This infers that the complexity of the algorithm is O(n). 
Properties of this algorithm: 
• No common sub-paths among paths: As seen from Step 4 of the Algorithm, we 
maintain a set A to hold all the nodes located on all the paths of the routes. Step 5( c) 
makes sure that no node that is already on a route is selected again. This eliminates 
the possibility of a node being repeated on the route which means no common sub-
paths. 
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• No node lies on two different paths: For the same reason that Step 5( c) makes sure 
that a node which is already on one of the routes will not be allowed to be selected on 
another route, the result is that, a same node does not appear on two different paths 
for a single message transmission. 
• Some paths may not reach S: While creating a route, it is made sure by step 5(c) that 
a node does not repeat on two different paths. So, in this next-node selection process 
if all the neighboring nodes are already placed on other routes, this route cannot be 
completed, in which case this path will not reach the source in this back to front 
approach. Hence this route will be deleted from the route domain and the algorithm 
continues. 
• No cycles in the paths: There is no possibility form the algorithm that a node that is 
on a particular route is selected again on to any f the rotes. That infers that a node will 
never appear twice on a route, meaning no cycles in the routes. 
It should be noted that this is a distributed algorithm, which means that there is no 
single centralized node which does all the calculations. All the calculations done by 
individual nodes in the sensor network are as follows: 
• When finding the next node on the route, each node calculates the ((1/ iset) X ip)of all 
its neighboring nodes 
• When the source node needs to transfer the packets, it determines the pattern of routes 
to be used for packet transfer by calculating ( 1/ Lj) X ( 1/ Sj). 
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Chapter 5 
SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
In order to investigate the performance of the proposed algorithm, it has been 
implemented as a C++ program. Classes like "node" and "route" are created so that their 
attributes and behaviors can be implemented in object-oriented manner. To generate the 
numerous network topologies necessary for testing, a highly efficient and flexible tool 
called "BRITE"[8] has been utilized. The topologies have been generated using BRITE 
on a Sun Solaris machine using the java version of "BRITE". The algorithm has been 
implemented talcing BRITE'S output file as an input to the C++ program as is and tested 
for performance with respect to energy efficiency and security issues. 
5.1 BRITE 
BRITE is a universal topology generator developed by researchers at Boston 
University [7]. BRITE was designed to be a flexible topology generator, not restricted to 
any particular way of generating topologies. As such, it supports multiple generation 
models. BRITE reads the generation parameters from a configuration file that can be 
either hand written by the user or automatically generated by BRITE's GUI. BRITE 
provides the capability of importing topologies generated by other topology generators or 
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topological data. It is possible to generate topologies using BRITE and then reuse them to 
generate other topologies by combining them with BRITE models or other imported 
formats [7]. For simulation of the proposed algorithm, a flat topology model is chosen. 
The parameters that BRITE talces are shown in Figure 4. 
II Paramet~r II Meaning Values 
HS Si~ of one side of the plane int 21 
LS Size of one side of a high-le\'el square int~ 1 
N Number of nodes int 1 s;J't < HS* HS 
Model model id int 21 
alpha Waxman-specific exponent O<a ~ ll!a: ER 
beta Waxman-specific exponent 0 < /j ~ 1,/j e R 
Node Placement how nodes are placed in the plane I: Random.2: HT 
m Number of links per new node int> 1 
Growth Type how nodes join the topology I: Incremental.2:Random 
BWdist bandwidth assignment to links l:Const.2:Unif.3:Exp.4:HT 
MaxBW, MinBW min. max link bandwidth values float> 0 
Figure 4: Flat topology parameters for BRITE [6] 
5.2 Format of BRITE Output 
A BRITE-formatted output file contains three sections [ 6]: 
1. Model information: Information about the topology contained in the file. Includes 
number of nodes and edges, and information specific to the model used to 
generate the topology. 
2. Node Section: For each node in the graph, a line is written into the output file 
with the following format: Nodeld xpos ypos indegree outgdegree ASid type. 
3. Edge Section: For each edge in the topology, information like edge id, from node, 
to node, length, delay, bandwidth, ASfrom, ASto and type are written to the 
output file. 
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A sample of BRITE's output generated with 10 nodes and 20 edges, HS= 1000 
and LS = 100 is shown in Figure 5. 
Topology: ( 10 Nodes, 20 Edges 
Model (3 - ASWaxman) : 10 1000 100 1 2 0.15 0.2 1 1 10.0 1024.0 
Nodes: ( 10 
0 179 771 2 2 0 AS_NONE 
1 958 484 2 2 1 AS NONE 
2 198 705 5 5 2 AS_NONE 
3 51 566 3 3 3 AS NONE 
4 398 552 4 4 4 AS NONE 
5 441 932 4 4 5 AS NONE 
6 486 267 6 6 6 AS_NONE 
7 36 774 6 6 7 AS NONE 
8 663 867 3 3 8 AS_NONE 
9 327 600 5 5 9 AS_NONE 
Edges: ( 20 
0 7 9 339.0531 -1.0 10.0 7 9 E AS NONE u 
1 7 8 633.8596 -1.0 10.0 7 8 E AS NONE u 
2 6 9 369.0122 -1.0 10.0 6 9 E AS NONE u 
3 6 7 677.90045 -1.0 10.0 6 7 E AS NONE u 
4 5 6 666.5208 -1.0 10.0 5 6 E AS NONE u 
5 5 7 434.72864 -1.0 10.0 5 7 E AS NONE u 
6 4 9 85.70297 -1.0 10.0 4 9 E AS NONE u 
7 4 6 298.2767 -1.0 10.0 4 6 E AS NONE u 
8 3 7 208.54016 -1.0 10.0 3 7 E AS NONE u 
9 3 6 527.85034 -1.0 10.0 3 6 E AS NONE u 
10 2 6 524.2023 -1.0 10.0 2 6 E AS NONE u 
11 2 7 17~.08237 -1.0 10.0 2 7 E AS NONE u 
12 1 4 564 .11346 -1.0 10.0 1 4 E AS NONE u 
13 1 5 684.10016 -1.0 10.0 1 5 E AS NONE u 
14 0 2 68. 680'42 -1.0 10.0 0 2 E AS NONE u 
15 0 4 309. 71277 -1.0 10.0 0 4 E AS NONE u 
16 9 2 166. 331 -1.0 10.0 9 2 E AS NONE u 
17 9 5 351. 02707 -1.0 10.0 9 5 E AS NONE u 
18 8 2 492. 4114 -1.0 10.0 8 2 E AS NONE u 
19 8 3 682.0154 -1.0 10.0 8 3 E AS NONE u 
Figure 5: Sample BRTE output 
All of the parameters output by BRITE are not necessary for our purpose. Only 
the nodes', their neighbors' and edges' data is required. 
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5.3 System attributes 
The simulations were performed at two levels of network sizes, with 10 sample 
points selected in level 1 and 30 sample points selected at level 2. The two network sizes 
are as follows: 
a) Sensor networks of size from 5 to 100 nodes. 
b) Sensor networks of size from 100 to 300 nodes. 
Other attributes considered for simulation are based on a representative example 
called Mica mote [3], a small sensor/actuator unit with a CPU, power source, radio, and 
several optional sensing elements. The CPU consumes 5.5 mA (at 3 volts) when active. 
And two orders of magnitude less when sleeping. The radio is a 916 MHz low-power 
radio from RFM, delivering up to 40 Kbps bandwidth on a single shared channel and 
with a range of up to a few dozen meters. The RFM radio consumes 4.8 mA (at 3 volts) 
in receive mode, up to 12 mA in transmit mode, and 5 µA in sleep mode. 
For the purpose of simulation, it is considered that all the nodes are in sleep mode 
except when receiving, computing or transmitting. Also, the sleep mode power 
consumption is ignored for comparison as it is of several orders less when compared to 
power consumption in active mode. 
The ability of putting nodes to sleep except when necessary can be obtained at 
lower levels of the network by using various possible techniques at the MAC layer. This 
thesis is limited to the network layer and routing algorithm. As mentioned earlier in the 
thesis, an optimal power saving sensor network is obtained by talcing measures at 
different layers of the network. 
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5.4 Graphs 
The fo llowing is the graph for comparing the energy consumption (based on the 
mica mote system attributes [3]) between the proposed algorithm and the flooding 
algorithm for the first level of network size. 
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Figure 6: Energy Consumption - Flooding versus proposed algorithm - Level I 
The graph in Figure 6 is drawn based on the results shown in Figure 7. Column 1 
lists the number of nodes in the network. Columns 2 and 3 list the amount of power 
consumed in milli Watts. These results obtained are for transmitting 40 Kbps over a one 
second period. The average power consumption for the two algorithms is as follows: 
a) Proposed Secure Energy Efficient algorithm- 1115 mW 
b) Flooding - 3117.945 mW 
This shows that the power consumed in case of flooding is almost three times that 
of the proposed algorithm. 
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Number of nodes Power consumed in mW using Power consumed in mW 
Proposed Algorithm using Flooding Algorithm 
6 66.9 200.7 
15 267.6 713.6 
20 245.3 646.7 
27 423.7 780.5 
34 468.3 1382.6 
56 869.7 2274.6 
72 802.8 2453 
88 914.3 2720.6 
94 869.7 2876.7 
100 1204.2 3099.7 
Figure 7: Simulation Output Data of Power consumption - Level I 
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Figure 8: Energy Consumption - Flooding versus proposed algorithm - Level 2 
The graph in Figure 8 shows the comparison of energy consumption between the 
proposed algorithm and the flooding algorithm for the second level of the network. This 
comparison graph is based on the simulation output data shown in Figure 9. 
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Number of nodes Power consumed in mW using Power consumed in mW 
Proposed Algorithm using Flooding Algorithm 
106 1360.3 1895.5 
123 1385.7 2007 
139 1449.5 2274.6 
148 1516.4 2698.3 
154 1583.3 2809.8 
164 1538.7 2943.6 
172 1650.2 3233.5 
177 1605.6 3389.6 
189 1784 3545.7 
194 1828.6 4036.3 
204 2029.3 3902.5 
218 1962.4 4214.7 
224 2051.6 4281.6 
238 2096.2 4326.2 
242 2319.2 4549.2 
249 2698.3 4482.3 
257 2542.2 4638.4 
262 2631.4 4995.2 
279 2742.9 4861.4 
286 2832.1 4928.3 
299 2943.6 5173.6 
311 2921.3 5285.1 
326 3077.4 5530.4 
334 3188.9 5374.3 
347 3255.8 5619.6 
363 3523.4 5887.2 
369 3389.6 6333.2 
375 3501.1 6266.3 
388 3657.2 6199.4 
396 3746.4 6400.1 
Figure 9: Simulation Output Data of Power consumption- Level 2 
In this case, the average power consumption for the two algorithms is as follows: 
a) Proposed Secure Energy Efficient algorithm-4697.587 mW 
b) Flooding - 8521.4 77 mW 
At level 2 it is observed that the power consumed with flooding is almost twice 
the amount of power consumed with the proposed algorithm. This shows that 
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implementation of the proposed algorithm saves a significant amount of energy in a 
sensor network. 
When the two graphs are compared, there is approximately 3:1 ratio of power 
consumption in the first graph and approximately a 2: I ratio in the second. As the 
network size increases, the proposed algorithm has numerous routes for packet 
transmission whose length may be much longer than shortest paths. So, when flooding is 
used, one of the paths taken by the flooding routes will be the shortest path and thus the 
packet reaches the destination faster at which point further flooding stops. As expected, 
there is extra amount of energy invested in flooding the packets all along different other 
routes. The fact that the difference in energy consumption is more in smaller networks is 
that the proposed algorithm computes fairly short routes if not the shortest routes. As the 
network size increases, the routes become longer, which means more energy is 
consumed. 
The security of the algorithm was validated by measuring the unpredictability of 
the sequence of routes used~ This is justified by the fact that the steps 6 and 7 of the 
algorithm ensure 2 things: 
1 . The optimal route is selected based on the length of the route and the number of 
previous selections of the route, thus making sure that the frequency of use of the 
computed routes is correctly balanced. 
2. At the same time, because this sequence of selection may have repeated patterns like 
for example with 6 routes and 12 packets for transmission, if the generated pattern is: 
3-4-6-l-3-4-6-1-2-5-2-5. 
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Here, the pattern 3-4-6-1 and 2-5 have repeated. At this point steps 6 and 7 of 
algorithm ensure that for a particular transmission, the route selection sequence does 
not have any such patterns. For each transmission, a route from the generated 
sequence is selected randomly and is removed from the sequence before selecting 
route for next transmission. The pattern used may therefore be as shown below as 
generated from a c++ simulation program: 
l-3-2-4-3-6-5-1-6-4-5-2. 
This clearly does not have any predictable patterns. 
Thus the optimal set of routes for the transmission of packets is ensured and at the 
same time the predictability of routes is reduced by randomly selecting the routes for the 
message. This ensures fewer opportunities for an attacker to eavesdrop and intrude. 
We next evaluated the routing overhead using our protocol. Figure 10 and Figure 
11 show that at all the times, the average number of hops on the shortest path is smaller 
than the average number of hops on a route obtained by the proposed algorithm. But this 
has always been expected as the penalty to be paid for routing ~ecurity. A strongly 
equipped adversary can easily compute the shortest path which means routing using the 
shortest path is not advised when security is one of the primary concerns in any sensor 
network application. 
This overhead is significant as the average path size increases. At level 1 ( Figure 
10), with the proposed algorithm, the average of all the nodes on all sizes of the networks 
is about 1.53 times larger than the average with shortest path algorithm. At level 2 
(Figure 11 ), the proposed algorithm's same average increases to about 2.25 times the 
average with the shortest path algoritlun. 
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This happens because at larger network sizes, the routes calculated by the 
proposed algorithm can be much longer than the shortest paths as there are more routing 
choices. The reason is the nature of the algorithm, where it determines the nodes on a 
route based on the number of neighbors of a particular node and as the network size 
increases, the neighbor node set increases. The increased choice means that many route 
calculated by the proposed algorithm are more likely to be significantly longer than the 
shortest path. 
The graph in Figure 12 shows that in case of shortest path routing algorithm, it is 
always only one route that is available for any packet transmission from a particular 
source to a destination. But in case of the proposed algorithm, there will be multiple 
options of routes available for each packet transmission, out of which one is selected 
based on an efficient criterion. This enhances security. A table listing the number of 
routes available for various network sizes as computed and used by the proposed routing 
algorithm is shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 12: Number of routes used-A comparison 
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Number of nodes Number of routes computed 
and used for routing 
6 3 
15 8 
20 10 
27 14 
34 17 
56 28 
72 36 
88 44 
94 47 
100 50 
106 53 
123 62 
139 70 
148 74 
154 77 
164 82 
172 86 
177 89 
189 95 
194 97 
204 102 
218 109 
224 112 
238 119 
242 121 
249 125 
257 129 
262 131 
279 140 
286 143 
299 150 
311 156 
326 163 
334 167 
347 174 
363 182 
369 185 
375 188 
388 194 
396 198 
Figure 13: Number of routes used by the proposed algorithm 
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Figure 15 and 16 are interesting comparisons between the shortest path algorithm 
and the proposed algorithm. Here there is a mobile adversary node that tries to intercept 
the packet transmission in the region of our sensor network. This mobile adversary keeps 
moving in the network region trying to intercept the sensor message information similar 
to a worm hole or a sink hole as described in [3] and [13]. The adversary when successful 
in intercepting a message by placing itself somewhere in the middle of two nodes doing a 
packet transmission stays there, intercepting all the information between them. 
At regular time intervals the adversary reconfirms continual packet transmission 
in the path it has intruded. In the absence of any continued transmission between the 
nodes, it starts moving again, trying to find another susceptible link. This scenario is 
modeled using a simulation program and the patterns and time period during which the 
adversary is successful or not is plotted as graphs in figure 15 and figure 16. Figure 15 
depicts the situation where there is only one mobile adversary and figure 16 when there 
are two mobile adversaries. 
The time or rate at which an adversary can detect or intercept the sensor nodes for 
tracking sensitive information depends on how powerful it is and how fast the adversary 
can move. 
In our simulation program the adversary node moves randomly in the vicinity of 
the sensor network. It makes movements at regular time intervals and the pattern of its 
movement will be random. Whenever the adversary changes its position in the network, it 
links itself to the two nearest nodes and tries to detect whether there is any information 
transmission between these nodes as shown in Figure 14. 
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Sensor Network 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 
0 0 
Figure 14: Adversary trying to create a faulty link between two nodes 
If it does not find any packet traffic between the two nodes, it continues changing 
it position until it finds one. The adversary node once it has detected packet transmission 
between two nodes, continues to stay there and intercept all subsequent packets. Thus, in 
case of shortest path routing, once a packet transmission is compromised, all the rest of 
the packets transmitted from that instance on will be intercepted by the adversary. 
However, in case of the proposed algorithm, it is highly difficult for an adversary 
to track down the pattern of paths used for packet transmission. Even if intermittently, an 
adversary has successfully placed itself between two nodes performing a packet 
transmission, it will not be able to make any further success based on that, because of the 
probability factor involved in the routing algorithm. 
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Figures 15 and 16 show that in the case of the shortest path algorithm, once the 
adversary detects information flow, it keeps sensing the information from that source 
node for the rest of the session lifetime. This is not the case with the proposed algorithm. 
The adversary may occasionally be able to sense the packet information by rigorous trial 
and error placement in the network. But it can only intermittently intercept packets, thus 
preserving the security and integrity of the transmission. 
It can be seen from Figure 16 that when there are two adversaries the sensor 
message information can be intercepted at a faster rate as expected. However, as the 
graphs show, the interception is much lower when the proposed algorithm is used for 
routing. 
5.5 Results 
Our simulation results show that the proposed algorithm is feasible and gives 
good performance to be implemented in a sensor network so as to gain security and have 
an energy efficient technique at the routing level of the network. 
Advantages of the algorithm can be briefly listed as follows: 
• Flooding is avoided, thus preserving a lot of energy. 
• Energy balance is attained among all the nodes, which favors longer network lifetime 
and does not unnecessarily deplete the energy of one node excessively. 
• The algorithm supports the incorporation of Identity Verification and Authentication 
suggested in Sybil attack/ HELLO flood attacks, countenneasures in Chapter 4. 
• The stochastic nature of the algorithm sums up for good security levels. 
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• When used with SNEP and µTESLA, might give reasonably good performance of 
overall data and routing protection. 
• The proposed algorithm can be easily extended to Ad-hoc networks with little 
changes. 
• The proposal algorithm is application independent and thus may be deployed for any 
sensor network or may be modified to suit any specific sensor application model. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Conclusions 
As with any other type of networks, communication security is an important 
factor to consider in sensor network routing schemes. In addition to security, since sensor 
nodes may be installed in locations were they cannot be easily replenished with battery 
power, intelligent power savings is also an important factor. This thesis investigates the 
problems of power consumption and security in sensor networks with respect to routing. 
A secure, energy efficient routing algorithm is proposed and is tested for feasibility and 
performance. The proposed algorithm is effective for security and is energy efficient in a 
sensor network. 
6.2 Future work 
The techniques used in the algorithm can be applied to application dependent 
routing algorithms, combined with security mechanisms like µTESLA and SNEP at 
MAC layer of the sensor network to obtain optimal security and power savings in a real 
time sensor application. 
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